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THE WALL STREET PANIC AND THE KOREAN ECONOMY
By Kim Dong-hwan
There may have been no one who anticipated the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, once one of the 
top five global investment banks. The shocking 
news reverberated through the Korean financial 
markets like a thunderclap. Subsequently, not a few 
Koreans suffered from the “September crisis,” when 
foreign investors were rumored to be on the verge of 
withdrawing capital from the local bond market en 
masse, especially in the second week of September 
2008. Fear eventually led to a sense of an impending 
crisis, which, in turn, threw the financial market into 
a panic. Since then, the dollar has surged and stock 
prices have plummeted. In spite of the U.S. govern-
ment’s $700 billion bailout plan, international and 
domestic financial markets are in the midst of a deep 
fog. Although more than a decade has passed since 
the 1997 economic crisis in Korea, the acute pain 
of that crisis and the memories of hardship appear 
to have resurfaced. This paper examines the causes 
and lessons of the Wall Street panic, then discusses 
the problems at hand for the Korean economy.
Brief History of Investment Banks
According to encyclopedias such as Oxford and 
Britannica, U.S. investment banks are similar to 
the merchant banks of the United Kingdom, de-
fined as institutions that underwrite large amounts 
of securities and then apportion and resell them to 
investors. The merchant banks have their origins in 
the acceptance of commercial notes issued by traders 
who immigrated to London from various European 
countries in the eighteenth century. Equipped with 
pioneering financial technology and vast amounts 
of information, they have wielded much power in 
the international financial market since at least the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Baring Brothers 
(now ING Group) and Rothschild were representa-
tive merchant banks that entered the U.S. financial 
markets in 1736 and 1837, respectively. In addition 
to dealing in and underwriting securities, they more 
recently began to provide deposit and loan services 
to wealthy clients as well as advise on and arrange 
mergers and acquisitions. Among these services, 
principal investment for capital gain through self-
financed or private equity funds has become one of 
their major businesses.
The era of the traditional merchant bank nearly 
ended after the capital market liberalization of 1986 
(the so-called Big Bang), as many of them merged 
with global financial institutions based in the United 
States or continental Europe. Merchant banks had 
much influence on U.S. private banks. Global 
investment banks like Goldman Sachs, Lehman 
Brothers, and Morgan Stanley were launched out of 
New England private banks established by German 
Jewish immigrants to the United States in the early 
nineteenth century. They used the western railway 
construction boom as a stepping-stone for growth 
before becoming investment banks in earnest after 
the passage on 16 June 1933 of the Glass-Steagall 
Act (officially named the Banking Act of 1933), 
which established the “separation of banking and 
securities activities.” This had a strong impact on 
U.S. banking regulation, as private banks separated 
into commercial banks and investment banks, with 
deposits and loans being the main businesses of 
commercial banks, and the dealing in and underwrit-
ing of securities as activities of investment banks. 
It was the very reason that J. P. Morgan, a private 
bank until 1935, was divided into the commercial 
bank, J. P. Morgan, and the investment bank, Mor-
gan Stanley.
In the 1960s, the U.S. stock market enjoyed a re-
naissance, and securities companies such as Merrill 
Lynch flourished, especially in the retail broker-
age service area. The golden age did not last long, 
however, as many investment banks saw stable fee 
revenues eroded by the abolition of the fixed-rate 
brokerage commission system on 1 May 1975. In 
response, investment banks frenetically developed 
new high-risk and high-return business areas, such 
as financing of mergers and acquisitions and de-
rivatives. Today, investment banks and securities 
companies are permitted to provide all financial 
services except for deposit and payment, as shown 
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in Table 1. One main change since the 1960s has 
been the provision of retail services for individual 
clients; previously their core businesses had been 
largely limited to wholesale services.
The 1987 Black Monday stock market crash was 
critical in precipitating major shifts in the U.S. 
capital markets. In the 1990s, megamergers among 
securities companies became prevalent, and a hand-
ful of giants began to dominate areas such as merg-
ers and acquisitions and the junk bond market. At 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, 
many investment banks could not avoid the tide 
of restructuring and drastic decreases in sales. By 
and large, the restructuring can be explained by 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) in the United 
States and the decreases in sales caused by the col-
lapse of the information technology (IT) bubble.
The GLB Act of 1999 replaced the Glass-Steagall 
Act and dismantled the wall between commercial 
and investment banks, triggering a restructuring of 
the U.S. financial industry. Meanwhile, the burst-
ing of the IT bubble (sometimes called the dot-com 
bubble) after 2000 eliminated a great deal of the 
New Economy business for investment banks. The 
2008 Wall Street panic seems to be another one of 
the inevitabilities of investment banks’ history. In 
other words, panic follows as a natural consequence 
of profit-seeking financial capitalism. A stampede 
of hostile takeovers and hypercompetition in the 
development and sale of products such as financial 
derivatives are not of help to the real economy, 
and, in fact, they undermine financial stability and 
safety by making the economy a victim of frequent 
booms and busts, even if they have contributed to 
enhancing financial market efficiency by enlarging 
business areas of the financial institutions.
Causes of the Wall Street Panic
Basically, the Wall Street panic that followed the 
avalanche of subprime mortgage defaults resulted 
from the fact that nobody knew the scale of the risk 
from asset securitization. Three kinds of risk are 
involved in asset securitization: credit risk, liquidity 
Table 1: Activities of Commercial Banks, Investment Banks, and Securities Companies in Korea 
 
Activities 
Types of banks 
Commercial 
banks 
Investment 
banks 
Securities 
companies 
Payments    
Deposits    
Loans to households and small firms 
(from deposits)    
Loans to large firms (from deposits    
Loans to large firms (from borrowings)    
Financial and management strategy 
advisory    
Principal investment (merchant bank)    
Underwriting    
Dealing    
Brokerage for institutional investors    
Brokerage for individual investors    
Loans to individual investors (from 
borrowings)    
 
Source: Nishimura Nobukatsu, Fund Business M&A Securitization Derivatives (Tokyo: Nikkei BP, 2005). 
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risk, and structural risk. Investors assume the credit 
risk on an investment in a mortgage-backed security 
(MBS): the possibility that the price of the MBS will 
fall or that the interest and principal will fail to be 
paid, a situation caused by a fall in housing prices 
or in the underlying MBS asset. Liquidity risk over 
a temporary liquidity contraction or credit crunch 
in the money market is also assumed, especially 
when the price of short-term asset-backed securities 
(ABSs), such as asset-backed commercial paper, 
falls or the interest and principal of an ABS fails 
to be paid. Finally, structural risk is assumed by all 
participants in the asset securitization process: com-
mercial banks, investment banks, credit-enhancing 
institutions such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
many monolines may take on a warranty liability or 
a surety in the process of handling products such as 
ABSs and MBSs that may subsequently be realized 
as a monetary loss. The problem is that it is hard to 
discern credit and liquidity risk, and structural risk 
tends to amplify capital market uncertainties even 
if the scale of the credit risk is relatively easy to 
ascertain. Furthermore, the easy monetary policy 
taken after the collapse of IT bubble has added more 
fuel to the fire, as pointed out by Kevin Rudd, the 
prime minister of Australia.
A direct cause of the bankruptcy of Lehman Broth-
ers was investment losses incurred from the secu-
ritization of risky assets, such as subprime MBSs. 
A ticking time bomb remains, however, in the 
form of structural risk exposure to vast amounts of 
financial derivatives such as credit default swaps 
(CDSs). In fact, many investment banks, includ-
ing Lehman Brothers, had made CDS contracts 
with originators—commercial banks and mortgage 
agencies—of mortgage loan securitization, on the 
condition that they would assume the losses incurred 
by securitization in place of receiving guaranteed 
fees from the originators. CDS losses from structural 
risk, however, might not show up on the books of 
both investment banks and commercial banks until 
the losses exceed a predetermined critical level and 
the underlying asset, for example, a mortgage loan, 
is subtracted from the balance sheet or ceases to be 
recognized as an asset of commercial banks. The 
structural risk would then develop into a liquidity 
risk and cause dysfunction in the payment system 
if large-scale losses are realized on mortgage loans 
owned by commercial banks. For these reasons, 
commercial banks and investment banks have had 
an incentive to conceal or postpone structural risk 
and the losses realized from it, and the U.S. govern-
ment eventually decided to spend more than $700 
billion to bail them out.
U.S. financial authorities were not able to discern 
the credit or liquidity risk, and thus they failed to 
prevent the diffusion of the former into the latter. 
They also have been accused of being too lax in 
addressing structural risk. These government or 
supervisory failures seem to be an indirect cause of 
the Wall Street panic. Sitting on their hands while 
allowing excessive wealth building through the lev-
eraged finance and asset securitization that formed 
the source of the calamity, these authorities helped 
facilitate the crisis.
Wealth building through leveraged finance utilizes 
various present and future assets and debt to produce 
a reciprocal leverage effect and generate abundant 
and continuous liquidity and credit in the money 
market. This differs from a more typical secured 
loan, in which the debt created is levered by col-
lateral made up of present assets. For example, a 
person obtains a mortgage loan (personal debt) 
from a commercial bank levered by the house itself 
(personal asset), then the commercial bank issues 
an MBS (commercial bank’s debt) to an investment 
bank levered by, that is, securitized by, the mortgage 
loan (commercial bank’s asset). The investment 
bank then sells a collateralized debt obligation (in-
vestment bank’s debt) to other investors levered by 
a pool of MBSs (investment bank’s asset). Lever-
aged finance, a combination of zaitech-type loans 
(zai is Japanese for “wealth”) and abnormal asset 
securitization, heated up the U.S. housing and stock 
markets in the 2000s. Zaitech-type loans, in fact, 
were notorious for aggravating the Japanese asset 
bubble in the latter half of the 1980s. Not a few 
scholars and journalists warned that excessively 
leveraged financing might cause an asset bubble 
and another “lost decade,” in which a burst bubble 
would render all the assets and debt involved in 
leveraged financing unhealthy and would plunge 
the U.S. economy into a long-term slump.
Second, abnormal asset securitization is a method in 
which originators do not transfer the property rights 
of underlying assets—such as mortgage loans—to 
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special-purpose vehicles; instead the originators 
make use of financial derivatives such as CDSs. It is 
abnormal in the sense that the two major principles 
of asset securitization—the “true sale” principle and 
the “bankruptcy remote” principle—are violated 
and also that it exposes financial institutions and 
investors to structural risk. Originators such as com-
mercial banks, for example, stand to be harmed not 
only from unhealthy asset soundness but also from 
being responsible for redemption of the MBSs and 
for legal flaws, especially when the mortgage loans 
become nonperforming. This is mainly caused by 
the fact that they did not comply with the true sale 
principle and kept the mortgage loans on their bal-
ance sheets. Investment banks and credit-enhancing 
institutions incur losses from warranty liabilities and 
sureties imposed on CDS contracts or collateralized 
debt obligation contracts. Hence, many general 
investors are exposed to the risk of bankruptcies of 
commercial banks or investment banks.
Discussion on the Future of Financial 
Capitalism
Since the 1980s, a surge in the prominence of 
neoliberal financial capitalism has overhauled the 
industry and broken down the walls of tradition. On 
the one hand, this surge has promoted the develop-
ment of financial technology and facilitated the 
ample provision of financial products and services 
to consumers. It has created a series of megatrends 
such as consolidation, universal or one-stop banking, 
and securitization, by which economies of scale and 
scope and the intermediary function of the capital 
markets were enhanced. On the other hand, it has 
not only undermined the safety of the payment 
system and the credibility of the capital markets by 
fostering bubbles, but it has also threatened the eco-
nomic sovereignty and national wealth of smaller, 
developing countries.
It is also true that not a few defects accompanied 
the megatrends, contrary to theoretical expectations. 
The trend of consolidation among financial institu-
tions has, because of less competition, entailed a 
scale diseconomy of bulky organizations. Consoli-
dation has also imperiled many small- to medium-
size financial companies. The trend of universal 
banking has been abused as a rationale for financial 
consolidation, bequeathing unfortunate scope disec-
onomies, which flattened preexisting firewalls and 
induced overcompetition among core businesses and 
financial institutions. The trend of securitization has 
also resulted in too much attention on investment 
banks and away from the traditional function of 
commercial banks. The capital markets became a 
place of speculation aimed at realizing short-term 
gains, thereby losing their intrinsic financial inter-
mediation function. Some of the same investment 
banks once touted as the flower of capitalism have 
been closed, and some are proclaiming that financial 
capitalism as we know it is coming to an end.
Yet each country’s financial market development 
and regulatory scheme differs. The ratio of capital 
market assets to gross domestic product in Korea, 
for example, is at most half of that of the United 
States. The share of investment banking business for 
Korean securities companies was only 5 percent in 
2005, far lower than the 45 percent for U.S. securi-
ties companies in the same year. In 1997, Korean 
households held just 27.0 percent of their wealth in 
the form of financial assets, versus 68.4 percent in 
the United States in 2000. Moreover, the government 
of Korea has maintained a strict financial regulatory 
regime, under which abnormal asset securitization 
via financial derivatives has not been permitted. 
Finally, major investment banks still do not exist in 
Korea, even though investment banking has been 
recognized and established as a business unit fol-
lowing the post-1997 International Monetary Fund–
coordinated financial consolidation and capital 
market liberalization. In light of these facts, views 
on the hypothesis of “the end of financial capital-
ism” may vary. In the case of Korea, the hypothesis 
could be said to go too far; but the United States, 
having adopted a relatively extreme capital market–
oriented financial system, may consider shifting the 
existing financial regulatory regime toward a more 
bank-oriented one (Figure 1). In a sense, the Wall 
Street panic could give a second-mover advantage 
to Korea, which had in fact been pursuing an Anglo-
American market-oriented financial system since 
1997. The reason is as follows.
The Wall Street panic has the attributes of a win-
ner’s curse in that the United States may have 
paid too high a cost to become the champion of 
the market-oriented financial system. A return to a 
bank-oriented financial system may be inevitable 
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since the U.S. capital markets are being pushed to 
the limit by the panic. The transformation of Gold-
man Sachs and Morgan Stanley into bank holding 
companies suggests a full-blown emergence of a 
CIB model in which commercial banks (CB) and 
investment banks (IB) are combined under a holding 
company.1 Such a model would mark the arrival of 
a new financial architecture designed to address the 
intrinsic limitations of investment banks with regard 
to financing and supervision.
Regulation or 
government paradigm
Deregulation or market 
paradigm
Bank-
oriented
Capital 
market–
oriented
• •
United States
Korea
Figure 1: Evolution of Financial Systems and 
Financial Regulation
Source: Author’s concept.
Note: Using comparative institutional analysis, Joseph 
Stiglitz, Masahiko Aoki, and others have shown that the 
economic system and regulatory regime of each country 
can be interpreted as a path- or history-dependent 
equilibrium. Hence, problems may arise if a country with a 
bank-oriented financial system attempts to shift to a 
market-oriented one, or vice versa.
• •
?
?
1. CIB is used here as an abbreviated acronym for the combination of commercial banks (CB) and investment banks (IB).
By contrast, Korea, which is still under a bank-
oriented financial system, does not need to follow 
the same track. Nonetheless, it should try to main-
tain aspects of a market-oriented financial system 
and a bank-oriented financial system, as both have 
merits and demerits. A market-oriented financial 
system functions best under perfect market condi-
tions. Such conditions never truly exist in practice, 
however, since market failures such as monopoly 
or asymmetric information are always present. 
These imperfections are the very reason government 
regulates the market. Historically, the bank-oriented 
financial system has flourished under an active 
regulatory regime and from long-term relationships 
between banks and firms. A bank-oriented financial 
system complements the market-oriented system in 
a real world where perfect market conditions are not 
always satisfied. Afterward, Korean banks should 
play a major role in the capital market and make use 
of the CIB model that will enable both the long-term 
cooperative function of the bank-oriented financial 
system and the short-term competitive function of 
the market-oriented financial system.
Future Tasks for the Korean Economy
The present economic circumstances in Korea are 
not as serious as during the 1997 crisis, when almost 
every economic indicator hit bottom and many ma-
jor corporations went bankrupt. The Bank for Inter-
national Settlements ratio for commercial banks was 
about 11 percent in 2008, in contrast with 7 percent 
in 1997, while foreign currency reserves stood at 
more than $200 billion in 2008, approximately 10 
times as high as in 1997. The global credit crunch, 
however, has developed into a full-blown crisis of 
trust and led to a period of deflation. Moreover, no 
one can be sure that a rush of latent market liquidity 
would not incite further problems, even though the 
present liquidity crunch is much bemoaned.
During the 1997 crisis, ex post microeconomic struc-
tural reform was necessary in order to improve the 
governance structure of insolvent firms. Now it is 
time to adopt preemptive macroeconomic structural 
reforms, which are urgently needed to prevent sur-
viving firms from falling into insolvency. Consider-
able fluctuations in asset prices, exchange rates, and 
short-term financial market liquidity are inevitable 
until the Wall Street panic subsides. Hence, it is un-
necessary for Korea to fluctuate between hopes and 
fears, even though there are wild daily fluctuations 
in asset prices, exchange rates, and market liquid-
ity. It is crucial that the Korean government protect 
domestic and foreign depositors and investors and 
reinforce financial supervisory and regulatory sys-
tems to minimize the toll that the external financial 
turmoil aggravated by the Wall Street panic has on 
the domestic economy.
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Bolster Supervision of Financial Derivatives 
Transactions
Financial derivatives have been abused as a tool 
of speculation, even though they are a good means 
for hedging risk. They have also been situated in 
a supervisory blind spot, mainly since they are off 
balance sheet. Financial authorities should bolster 
supervision of derivatives transactions to encourage 
risk hedging. Specifically, authorities should moni-
tor each type of the financial institutions’ risk expo-
sure from various off-balance-sheet transactions and 
ascertain whether accountability, suitability, and the 
know-your-customer rule, among others, are being 
appropriately applied. They should strengthen the 
payment system and macroprudential supervision 
to ensure that the credit and structural risks accom-
panying asset securitization are not transmitted to 
the overall liquidity risk; otherwise, the Bank of 
Korea should assume the liquidity risk as a lender 
of last resort. Authorities should also monitor the 
compliance officers of financial institutions so that 
abnormal asset securitization, violating the true sale 
and bankruptcy remote principles, is not done.
Preemptive Macroeconomic Structural Reform
Preemptive macroeconomic structural reform 
(PMSR) should be based on the following three 
principles. First, it should recover market trust by 
alleviating the credit crunch epidemic. The Korean 
economy could face catastrophe from a collapse of 
trust if previously healthy firms fall into a liquidity 
crisis that results in mass bankruptcies. Creditor 
banks should draw up prompt workout plans for 
firms that have fallen into a temporary liquidity 
crisis, and financial authorities should make the 
existing procyclical supervisory rules, like Basel II, 
more flexible and countercyclical. Loans to firms 
that have filed for preworkout or reorganization 
procedures should be given preferential treatment 
in the asset classification and loss provisions.
Second, PMSR should counter deflationary pres-
sure by unhinging the supply-side bottleneck for 
Korea, which has struggled to find new growth 
drivers since the 1997 crisis. Without such drivers, 
supply capacity has always been limited. Now that 
the financial crisis is spreading to the real economy, 
the supply curve should be shifted to the right to 
boost both gross national product and employment. 
Specifically, the government should (1) foster 
employment-inducing high-tech industries through 
small- and medium-size enterprises, (2) increase the 
productivity of the service industry, and (3) prepare 
outplacement measures for the surplus of workers 
in the service industry. In general, the supply-side 
bottleneck is found in the high-risk and public sec-
tors, where active loans, investments, and guarantees 
by state-owned financial institutions or development 
financial institutions are needed. These include the 
development of regional and social overhead capital 
and human capital, protection of the environment, 
outplacement, relief from natural disasters and the 
economic depression, full-blown restructuring of 
industries and firms, and relief for credit delin-
quents from the public sector. Fostering innovative 
entrepreneurs and future growth engines such as 
the biotechnology and nanotechnology industries, 
developing an alternative energy industry and an 
aerospace industry, building inter-Korean economic 
cooperation, and promoting the evaluation and com-
mercialization of venture technology all fall under 
the high-risk sector.
Third, PMSR should involve a bailout plan that 
combines flexible monetary policy with resolute 
corporate restructuring measures. An inflationary 
monetary policy will be unavoidable in order to 
cope with the present credit crunch, but excessive 
money issuance and hesitant corporate restructuring 
would render the Korean economy unable to cope 
with hyperinflation or a bubble in case excess latent 
liquidity gushes into the market. In these circum-
stances, repurchase agreements are a convenient and 
dynamic anti-inflationary measure that can rein in 
such excessive liquidity. Debt-equity swaps, debt-
debt swaps, debtor-in-possession financing, and 
loan covenants with remuneration contingent on 
success are good corporate restructuring measures 
for promising firms that have fallen into a temporary 
liquidity crisis. Firms that have fallen into a solvency 
crisis should be liquidated according to the unified 
bankruptcy law.
Alleviate Uncertainty via Regulatory Change
A series of deregulatory policies, including a sepa-
ration between banking and commerce, should be 
carefully implemented so that the efficiency, fair-
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ness, and stability of the financial markets are not 
disturbed. The reasons are as follows. First, anony-
mous financial consumers stand to be harmed if the 
efficiency of the financial markets is damaged by 
market failures. Second, specific financial consum-
ers also stand to be harmed if the integrity of the 
financial markets is damaged by a few interested 
parties or stakeholders who seek rents unfairly. 
Third, the economic foundations would collapse if 
impaired financial market stability results in nega-
tive externalities for or a contagion effect toward the 
payment system and the real economy.
In particular, the “negative system” has been a 
symbol of deregulation since the Capital Markets 
Consolidation Act was enacted in Korea. It is hoped 
that a negative system will raise the efficiency of 
the financial markets although such deregulation 
may in fact create negative momentum by break-
ing away from the tradition of the Glass-Steagall 
Act and overheating competition among financial 
institutions for enlarging core businesses. Moreover, 
certain business areas may be abruptly prohibited 
or restricted in the process of deregulation, which 
might become a nuisance disturbing the financial 
markets. To minimize such regulatory uncertainty, 
the government should apply the Capital Markets 
Consolidation Act as narrowly as possible and not 
apply it, for example, when investment banks want 
to participate in the payment system.
Dr. Kim is Chief of the Financial Institutions Re-
search Division, Korea Institute of Finance.
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